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I. INTRODUCTION
The Endangered Species Act (ESA) is our nation’s landmark
environmental protection statute. It is a bold commitment to preserving
endangered and threatened species. However, protecting vulnerable
species is not without costs to governmental agencies and landowners.
These economic and efficiency costs have made the law controversial.
This article will avoid the question of the relative merits of the law;
instead, it will focus on the law’s ability to protect not only endangered
and threatened species, but also unlisted species that are in decline through
innovative programs to protect habitat.
To lay the groundwork for understanding the ESA’s ability to
prevent species from becoming threatened in the first instance; this article
will start with an introduction to the ESA. It will then identify some of the
problems landowners have faced under the original strict implementation
of the law. Next, it will address the new programs the federal government
has developed to provide greater flexibility in the law through stakeholder
participation in voluntary conservation agreements. Finally, it will
suggest incremental advancements in the law and its implementing
regulations to further protect vulnerable species and the habitat they rely
upon.
II. THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
The ESA was passed as a reaction to the alarming number of
species that had become extinct during the rapid expansion of the nation.
In the 1970s, when the law was enacted, at least one species per year was
going extinct and the number was accelerating.1 The growth of the
environmental movement and public outrage over the loss of these species
caused Congress to act. Believing that biodiversity held unknown
1.

Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 176 (1978).
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scientific and medical benefits for humankind, Congress passed the ESA
in 1973 to act as a “road block” in the path of future extinctions.2 The law
was intended to be overly prescriptive to account for the lack of scientific
3
certainty in the rate and causes of the decline in species populations.
Although the concept was common in Europe at the time, this was one of
the first expressions of the “precautionary principle” in American law.
Briefly stated, the precautionary principle ensures that when there is
scientific uncertainty about the effect of a proposed action, policy makers
should pursue the most conservative option possible.4 Basically, it is
better to prevent the decline of a species than it is to try to recover a
depleted population caused by a mistake.
A. ESA § 2 – Purpose
The stated purpose of the ESA is to “provide a means whereby the
ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species depend
may be conserved, [and] to provide a program for the conservation of such
5
endangered species and threatened species.” Five years after the law’s
enactment, the Supreme Court stated, “the language, history, and structure
of [the ESA] indicates beyond doubt that Congress intended endangered
6
species to be afforded the highest of priorities.” Despite the nation’s
desire to make protecting vulnerable species our highest priority, the ESA
has had little substantive impact; instead, the law lays out the procedural
requirements that a federal agency must comply with before it can act.7
The Interior Department’s U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS)
and the Commerce Department’s National Marine Fisheries Service

2.
Id.
3.
Karin P. Sheldon, Habitat Conservation Planning: Addressing the
Achilles Heel of the Endangered Species Act, 6 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 279, 285 (1997–
1998).
4.
James Cameron and Juli Abouchar, The Precautionary Principle: A
Fundamental Principle of Law and Policy for the Protection of the Global
Environment, 14 B.C. Intl. & Comp. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1991).
5.
16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2012).
6.
Tennessee Valley Auth., 437 U.S. at 174.
7.
Martha F. Phelps, Candidate Conservation Agreements Under the
Endangered Species Act: Prospects and Perils of an Administrative Experiment, 25
B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 175, 178 (1997).
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(NMFS) co-administer the ESA. The FWS has primary responsibility
for terrestrial and freshwater organisms, while the NMFS is responsible
for marine wildlife and anadromous fish such as whales and salmon.10
B. ESA § 4 – Listing a species as endangered or threatened
A species may be listed as either endangered or threatened. An
endangered species is one that is in danger of extinction throughout all or
11
a significant portion of its range.
A threatened species is one that is
likely to become endangered within the foreseeable future.12 Even if a
species as a whole is doing well, a distinct population segment may be
listed if it meets the statutory criteria.13 Listing a species is the threshold
event that triggers the protections of the ESA.14 Once listed, a species is
broadly protected from “harm.”15 This makes the decision to list
“critically important because it sets in motion the [ESA’s] other
provisions.”16 The listing decision is based on five criteria:
(A) the present or threatened destruction, modification, or
curtailment of [the species’] habitat or range; (B)
overutilization for commercial, recreational, scientific, or
educational purposes; (C) disease or predation; (D) the
inadequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms; or (E)

8.
FWS, ESA Basics: 40 Years of Conserving Endangered Species 1 (Jan.
2013) (available at http://www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-library/pdf/ESA_basics.pdf)
[hereinafter FWS, ESA Basics].
9.
Unless noted otherwise, this article will use FWS to refer to both the
FWS and the NMFS.
10.
Chad W. Lamer, Habitat Conservation Plans: Balancing the
Endangered Species Act’s Protections of Threatened and Endangered Species while
Providing Landowners with Options for the Development of Land Containing Critical
Habitat Areas, 18 Penn. St. Envtl. L. Rev. 25, 26 (2009–2010).
11.
16 U.S.C. § 1532(6) (2012).
12.
Id. at § 1532(20).
13.
ESA Basics, supra n. 8, at 1.
14.
50 C.F.R. §§ 17.11, 17.12 (2013).
15.
Id. at § 17.3 (Harm is defined as “an act which actually kills or injures
wildlife. Such act may include significant habitat modification or degradation where
it actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral
patterns, including breeding, feeding, or sheltering.”).
16.
S. Rep. No. 418, at 10 (1982).
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other natural or manmade factors affecting [the species’]
continued existence.17
Additionally, the ESA instructs the FWS to consider efforts made
by states, foreign nation, or Indian tribe to protect the species when
making a listing decision.18 Although it may consider these conservation
efforts, Congress specifically forbade the FWS from considering the
economic impacts of listing the species.19 If the agency finds that listing a
species as threatened or endangered is warranted based on one or more of
20
the five factors, the agency must list the species.
The FWS also maintains a list of “candidate” species for which it
has sufficient information to warrant listing, but that it is precluded from
listing at the time because of limited financial resources or the presence of
higher priority species.21 Listing a species as warranted but precluded
“encourage[s] Federal agencies and other appropriate parties to take these
22
taxa into account in environmental planning.”
C. ESA § 6 – Cooperation with the States
In 1896, the U.S. Supreme Court decided in Geer v. Connecticut
that state governments have the sole authority to regulate wildlife within
their borders.23 However, over time, this exclusive authority has eroded.
In 1900, Congress passed the Lacey Act that made it illegal to transport
illegally killed wildlife across state lines.24 In 1918, Congress enacted the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act, which implemented the 1916 Migratory Bird
Treaty between the United States, Mexico, and Great Britain.25 This law
made it illegal to kill certain listed species of birds that crossed state or

17.
16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1)(A)–(E).
18.
Id. at § 1533(b)(1)(A).
19.
H.R. Rpt. 97–567 at 20 (May 17, 1982).
20.
50 C.F.R. § 424.11(c).
21.
Id. at § 424.02(b).
22.
Annual Notice of Review, 54 Fed. Reg. 554 (Jan. 6,1989).
23.
Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
24.
16 U.S.C. §§ 3371–3378.
25.
Id. at §§ 703–712. Canada was not an independent nation at the time
and was still part of Great Britain.
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international boundaries. At that time, federal control of migratory birds
was acceptable because they were viewed as sui generis based on their
international range.27 Since then, as part of the general expansion of
federal powers, the federal government has asserted more power to
regulate wildlife; however, it still does not have plenary power to regulate
all wildlife within the nation.28 That is why the ESA includes a section
directing the FWS to cooperate with state governments to achieve the goal
of preventing extinctions.29Without voluntary cooperation, the FWS
would have no tools to prevent a species from declining to the point where
it must be listed.
Section 6 directs FWS to cooperate with states to the maximum
extent practicable to conserve both listed and unlisted species.30 It allows
states to enter into agreements for the administration and management of
endangered or threatened species within their borders.31 This is an
example of cooperative federalism where national policy is set by the
26.
Id. at § 703(a) (“Unless and except as permitted by regulations made as
hereinafter provided in this subchapter, it shall be unlawful at any time, by any means
or in any manner, to pursue, hunt, take, capture, kill, attempt to take, capture, or kill,
possess, offer for sale, sell, offer to barter, barter, offer to purchase, purchase, deliver
for shipment, ship, export, import, cause to be shipped, exported, or imported, deliver
for transportation, transport or cause to be transported, carry or cause to be carried, or
receive for shipment, transportation, carriage, or export, any migratory bird, any part,
nest, or egg of any such bird, or any product, whether or not manufactured, which
consists, or is composed in whole or part, of any such bird or any part, nest, or egg
thereof, included in the terms of the conventions between the United States and Great
Britain . . . .”).
27.
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 435 (1920) (“Here a national interest
of very nearly the first magnitude is involved. It can be protected only by national
action in concert with that of another power. The subject-matter is only transitorily
within the State and has no permanent habitat therein. But for the treaty and the
statute there soon might be no birds for any powers to deal with. We see nothing in
the Constitution that compels the Government to sit by while a food supply is cut off
and the protectors of our forests and our crops are destroyed. It is not sufficient to rely
upon the States. The reliance is vain, and were it otherwise, the question is whether
the United States is forbidden to act. We are of opinion that the treaty and statute
must be upheld.”).
28.
George Cameron Coggins and William H. Hensley, Constitutional
Limits on Federal Power to Protect and Manage Wildlife: Is the Endangered Species
Act Endangered, 61 Iowa L. Rev. 1099, 1136 (1976).
29.
Id.
30.
16 U.S.C. § 1535.
31.
Id. at § 1535(b).
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federal government and individual states are allowed to achieve the goal in
a way that best suits its citizens.32 The authority for states to enter into
collaborative stewardship agreements is important because they retain
33
management authority over candidate species until they are listed. This
creates an incentive for states to maintain at least the status quo of a
species.
D. ESA § 7 – Inter Federal Agency Consultation
Although Section 7 is a procedural section and does not provide
any substantive protections, it “provides some of the most valuable and
powerful tools to conserve listed species, assist with species’ recovery,
and help protect critical habitat.”34 Section 7(a)(2) requires all federal
agencies to ensure that a proposed action will not jeopardize the existence
of a listed species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of its
critical habitat by consulting with the FWS before the agency authorizes,
funds, or carries out any action.35 In fulfilling this requirement, the
36
agency must use the best scientific and commercial data available.
To respond to an agency’s request for consultation, the FWS
produces a biological opinion detailing how the agency’s proposed course
37
that of action will affect the species and its critical habitat. If it finds the
action will jeopardize a species or adversely modify its habitat, the FWS
must suggest reasonable alternatives to the agency’s preferred course of
action that would reduce the amount of harm to the species.38 Unlike
during a listing decision, the FWS may consider the economic impacts of

32.
See Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201–
1328; Clean Water Act 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387; and Clean Air Act 42 U.S.C. §§
7401–7626 for other examples of statutes using cooperative federalism.
33.
16 U.S.C. § 1535.
34.
Final ESA Section 7 Consultation Handbook 1–1 (Mar. 1998) (available
at http://www.fws.govendangeredesa-librarypdfesa_section7_handbook.pdf).
35.
16 U.S.C. § 1535(a)(2).
36.
Id.
37.
Id. at § 1535(a)(3)(A).
38.
FWS, Endangered Species Consultation Handbook: Procedures for
Conducting Consultation and Conference under Section 7 of the Endangered Species
Act (Mar. 1998) (available at http://www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-library/pdf/
esa_section7_handbook.pdf).
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the alternatives it proposes. To ensure that an agency does not attempt
to act first and ask for forgiveness later, the section also prevents an
agency from making an irreversible or irretrievable commitment of
40
resources before it has obtained the FWS’s biological opinion.
E. ESA § 9 – Prohibited Acts
Section 9 is the teeth of the ESA.41 It makes it unlawful for a
person to “take” a listed species without a permit and imposes criminal
and civil punishments for doing so.42 The act defines “take” as “to harass,
harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect or attempt
to engage in any such conduct.”43 The term “harm” is defined as “an act
which actually kills or injures fish or wildlife [including] significant
habitat modification or degradation.”44
Because of the harsh punishments possible for running afoul of
Section 9, it is the stick that the FWS uses to entice landowners to enter
into the voluntary conservation agreements.45 However, at times the FWS

39.
Pamela Baldwin, The Endangered Species Act: Consideration of
Economic Factors 5 (Cong Research Serv. April 15, 2003) (available at http://
www.law.umaryland.edu/marshallcrsreportscrs/documents/RL30792_04152003.pdf)
(“Therefore, although economic factors are not to be considered in the listing of a
species as endangered or threatened, economic factors must be considered when
deciding whether and where to designate critical habitat, and some habitat areas may
be excluded from designation based on such concerns, unless the failure to designate
the habitat would result in the extinction of the subject species.”).
40.
16 U.S.C. § 1535(d).
41.
Id. at §1538.
42.
Id. at §1538(a)(1) (“Except as provided in sections 1535 (g)(2) and 1539
of this title, with respect to any endangered species of fish or wildlife listed pursuant
to section 1533 of this title it is unlawful for any person subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States to . . . (B) take any such species within the United States or the
territorial sea of the United States . . . .”).
43.
Id. at § 1532(19).
44.
50 C.F.R. § 222.102.
45.
Kirsten Uchitel, Pece and Cooperative Conservation: Innovation or
Subversion under the Endangered Species Act?, 26 J. Land, Resources & Envtl. L.
233, 262 (2006) (noting that under the second Bush Administration the FWS preferred
to use incentives such as “cooperation, innovation, and entrepreneurship” rather than
“sticks”— “fees, fines and punishment as the primary tools with which to achieve
environmental results.”); Sheldon, supra n. 3, at 293 (“The first prosecution for a
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has lacked the will or political capital to prosecute violations of the
ESA.46 At other times, violators have received punishments equal to or
less than the cost of entering into the conservation agreements that Section
47
9 should encourage.
When the punishment for violating Section 9 is
less than the costs of not violating the law, there is little incentive for
landowners to take proactive steps to avoid taking endangered species.
F. ESA § 10 – Exceptions
Section 10(a) allows the FWS to issue permits for the incidental
take of a species that would otherwise be prohibited by section 9.48 In
order to obtain an incidental take permit (ITP) the applicant must prove (i)
the take will be incidental to a lawful activity, (ii) the applicant will to the
maximum extent practicable, minimize and mitigate the impacts on the
species, (iii) that it has an adequate source of funding, and (iv) issuing the
permit will not appreciably reduce the likelihood of the survival and
recovery of the species in the wild.49
Congress added this section in response to the Palila decisions,
wherein the full extent of acts that may result in a “take,” and be enjoined
under Section 9, was revealed.50 In Palila v. Hawaii Dep’t. of Land &
Natural Resources, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that when the
state of Hawaii allowed wild sheep to destroy the Palila’s (an endangered
bird) designated critical habitat, that action constituted a take under the
ESA.51 The court therefore ordered the State to remove the sheep.52
Congress reacted in 1982 by adding Section 10(a) to the ESA to allow for
the incidental take of a species.53 This small retreat from the absolute

taking based on significant modification of endangered species habitat did not occur
until 1990, seventeen years after the ESA was passed.”).
46.
Uchitel, supra n. 45, at 262.
47.
Id.
48.
16 U.S.C. at § 1539(a).
49.
Id. at § 1539(a)(2)(B).
50.
Sheldon, supra n. 3, at 295.
51.
Palila v. Hawaii Dep’t. of Land & Natural Resources, 639 F.2d 495
(9th Cir. 1981).
52.
Id.
53.
Sheldon, supra n. 3, at 293 (“Prior to the Palila cases in 1979 and 1981,
the only court to consider the application of Section 9 to habitat impacts adopted a
limited reading of the section’s reach.”).

CONNORS.11.24 (DO NOT DELETE)

156

12/4/2014 10:05 PM

PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW

Vol. 35

prohibition on take has allowed the FWS to fashion creative programs that
allow for limited take of a species in exchange for conservation
commitments from landowners.
III. THE INABILITY OF THE ESA TO PROTECT UNLISTED
SPECIES PRIOR TO LISTING
A weakness in the ESA is the lack of authority to take actions that
would prevent the listing of a species in decline. By the time a species is
almost extinct, the cost of recovery is much higher. Taking action before
it is too late would decrease the overall cost to landowners and the
government.
A. The ESA incentivizes landowners to prevent listed or declining species
from occupying their land
Private land is free from regulation under the ESA unless a listed
species, or its designated critical habitat, can be found on his land.54
Therefore, it is relatively easy for a landowner to evade the ESA by
eliminating the species’ habitat from his land. This will remove the
species or prevent it from recolonizing land that was once part of its range.
This evasive action involves exactly what the law was intended to avoid
— the destruction of an endangered species’ habitat.55 As the National
Association of Home Builders explains in their Developer’s Guide to
Endangered Species Regulation:
[T]he highest level of assurance that a property owner will
not face an ESA issue is to maintain the property in a
condition such that protected species cannot occupy the
property. . . . This is referred to as the “scorched earth”
technique.56

54.
Barton H. Thompson, Conservation Options: Toward a Greater Private
Role, 21 Va. Envtl. L.J. 245, 295 (2002–2003).
55.
Dean Lueck and Jeffrey A. Michael, Preemptive Habitat Destruction
Under the Endangered Species Act, 27 J.L. & Econ. 27, 28 (Apr. 2003).
56.
National Association of Home Builders, Developer’s Guide to
Endangered Species Regulation, 109 (Home Builder Press 1996).
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The cost to a landowner of allowing an endangered species to
occupy their land creates an incentive to make it inhospitable for
vulnerable species. A possible solution to this problem that involves
punishing preemptive habitat destruction is suggested below.
B. The ESA prevents landowners from taking beneficial actions that might
have short-term negative impacts
The ESA imposes an absolute prohibition on the unpermitted take
of a listed species.57 However, sometimes an action taken to improve
habitat for a listed species will result in a limited, but illegal, take of the
species. For example, the Montana DNRC listed the ability to remove
culverts to restore stream connectivity and reduce sedimentation as one of
their priorities for protecting the endangered Bull Trout.58 However, the
removal of the culverts would be illegal because it would result in the
temporary impairment of the stream and result in the nominal “take of the
species.59
IV. PROGRAMS CREATED TO PROVIDE FLEXIBILITY FOR
LANDOWNERS AND PROTECT VULNERABLE SPECIES
Except for the drafters of the law, almost no one understood how
powerful the ESA would be when it was enacted. However, because it is
such a powerful law, people have been fighting to repeal or modify it from
day one.60 Efforts to avoid the strictures of the law have come in many
forms: attempts to repeal the law, legislation to defund the FWS’s
authority to list new species or designate critical habitat, and nonenforcement.61 In response to these criticisms, the FWS has created

57.
16 U.S.C. §1538(a)(1).
58.
Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation, Forested
State Trust Lands Habitat Conservation Plan: Final EIS, vol. 1, p. 3–31 (Sep. 2010)
(available
at
http://leg.mt.gov/content/publications/mepa2010/
dnr0923_2010001a.pdf).
59.
Id.
60.
Keith W. Rizzardi, The Duty to Advise the Lorax: Environmental
Advocacy and the Risk of Reform, 37 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Policy Rev. 25, 57
(2012) (available at http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmelpr/vol37/iss13).
61.
Id.
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programs that allow landowners to act proactively to conserve their land
and avoid Section 9 liability while protecting listed species.62
A. Habitat Conservation Plans
As discussed above, in 1982, the rigidity of Section 9 prompted
Congress to amend the ESA to add Section 10(a).63 This allows a
landowner who thinks their actions may harm a listed species to develop a
conservation plan and obtain an ITP to avoid an illegal take of the
species.64 The conservation plan must identify the likely impacts on the
species and the measures the permit applicant is willing to undertake to
minimize and mitigate those impacts.65 These conservation plans have
come to be known as “habitat conservation plans” or “HCPs.” In 1996,
the FWS issued “detailed but flexible guidelines” for drafting an HCP and
66
obtaining an ITP.
The five criteria for approving an HCP are:
(1) the take will be incidental; (2) the applicant will, to the
maximum extent practicable, minimize and mitigate the
impacts of the taking; (3) the applicant will ensure
adequate funding for the plan; (4) the take will not
appreciably reduce the likelihood of the survival and
recovery of the species in the wild; and (5) any other
measures FWS may require.67
These criteria are important because the FWS must approve an
HCP and issue the applicant an ITP if these conditions are met,.68
Determining what level of mitigation efforts is the “maximum amount
practical” is important but difficult because an HCP will always allow
some level of impact on a listed species that could be further reduced
62.
16 U.S.C. at § 1539(a).
63.
Sheldon, supra n. 3, at 293
64.
Lamer, supra n. 10, at 38.
65.
16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(A).
66.
FWS, Habitat Conservation Planning and Incidental Take Permit
Processing Handbook 3–38 (Nov. 4, 1996) (available at http://www.fws.gov/
endangered/esa-library/pdf/HCPBKTOC.PDF).
67.
16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B).
68.
Id.
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towards zero. The case law is not clear on the issue, but at a minimum,
the FWS must state what additional mitigation efforts it considered and
why it rejected those additional measures as impracticable.69
One criticism of the HCP process is the relatively low level of
conservation measures that are required to obtain an ITP.70 By definition,
an ITP allows for the “take” of a listed species or the destruction of its
habitat. All that an applicant must show is that the impact on the species
“will not appreciably reduce the likelihood of survival and recovery of the
species in the wild.”71 This is not a high threshold and it could allow a
species to slip through the cracks. One suggestion to improve the process
would be to require the application to prove that the project will provide a
net conservation benefit for the covered species. Granting an ITP is a
matter of administrative grace and more should be asked of an applicant in
exchange for immunizing the applicant from liability under the ESA.
B. Candidate Conservation Agreements
Candidate Conservation Agreements (CCA) are formal voluntary
agreements between the FWS and one or more parties. The purpose of a
CCA is to address the conservation needs of candidate species and other
72
unlisted species in decline.
Because a landowner does not receive
protections from future ESA enforcement, CCAs have been used mostly
by federal agencies and Indian tribes.73 Federal agencies are not eligible
for the assurances discussed below because that would negate their
mandatory duty under Section 7 to consult with the FWS before taking
any action that might adversely affect a listed species.74

69.
See e.g. National Wildlife Federation v. Babbitt, 128 F. Supp. 2d 1274,
1292 (E.D. Cal. 2000) (finding the FWS had acted in an arbitrary and capricious
manner when it did not consider an alternative involving greater mitigation measures).
70.
John Kostyack, Reshaping Habitat Conservation Plans for Species
Recovery: An Introduction to a Series of Articles on Habitat Conservation Plans, 27
Envtl. L. 755, 757 (1997).
71.
16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(iv).
72.
FWS, Candidate Conservation Agreements (Mar. 2011) (available at
http://www.fws.gov/Endangered./esa-library/pdf/CCAs.pdf)
[hereinafter
FWS,
Candidate Conservation Agreements].
73.
Phelps, supra n. 7, at 175.
74.
16 U.S.C. § 1535.
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C. Candidate Conservation Agreements with Assurances
The FWS developed Candidate Conservation Agreements with
Assurances (CCAA) to address landowners’ desires to obtain assurances
that they will not have to take additional measures when the species is
75
later listed if they comply with the terms of the CCAA.
This program
gives non-Federal landowners incentives to voluntarily implement
conservation measures to protect candidate species on their land.76 There
are several assurances that a CCAA provides. First, the level of
conservation measures that the landowner will be required to undertake is
set when the CCAA is approved and cannot be modified when the species
is later listed, even if the CCAA was based on incorrect assumptions about
the species.77 Second, the landowner is immune from liability under
Section 9 for the activities approved in the CCAA.78
To receive these assurances, an applicant must prove that the
conservation measures in the proposed CCAA would preclude the need to
list the species if combined with the same level of conservation measures
79
on all other properties throughout the specie’s range.
To determine
whether a CCAA meets this standard, the FWS looks for reductions in
threats to the species on the property, the degree to which the conservation
benefits offset the impacts from any take that might occur, and the
hypothetical effects of conservation measures on the other properties.80
For candidate species, the FWS assesses the degree to which the
conservation measures in the CCAA address the factors in the five listing
factors discussed above.81 For non-candidate species, the FWS conducts a

75.
FWS, Candidate Conservation Agreements, supra n. 72.
76.
Id.
77.
Id.
78.
Id.
79.
FWS, Draft Candidate Conservation Agreements with Assurances
Handbook 14 (June 2003) (available at http://www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-library/
pdf/handbooktext.pdf).
80.
Id.
81.
Amelia Orton-Palmer, Candidate Conservation Agreements and
Candidate Conservation Agreements with Assurances under the ESA, 2 Rocky
Mountain Mineral Law Foundation Paper No. 9 (2012) (available at http://
trove.nla.gov.au/result?q=amelia%20palmer).
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similar analysis based on the best information available on the species and
its threats.82
When there is less information about a species, the decision on the
amount of conservation measures to require in order to obtain the
protections of a CCAA is more speculative. This could result in the FWS
making a commitment that last for decades based on incorrect
information. As discussed below, the requirement for approving a CCAA
should be amended to require the FWS to apply the precautionary
principle before granting these irrevocable assurances.
D. Safe Harbor Agreements
Safe Harbor Agreements (SHA) provide regulatory assurances for
landowners who voluntarily agree to aid in the recovery of listed species
by improving or increasing the amount of habitat on their land. As part of
a SHA, a landowner agrees to improve their land to benefit a listed species
for a set amount of time.83 Once the period is over, the landowner may
restore his land to its baseline condition without risking violating Section
9, even if it results in the “take” of the species or the destruction of
habitat.84
E. Conservation Banking
One of the more innovative new programs that the FWS has
developed is the conservation-banking program.85 A conservation bank is
a tract of land that is permanently protected and actively managed to
benefit an endangered species. The land in the conservation bank is used
to offset the loss of similar habitat elsewhere.86 Conservation banking is a
free-market approach based on the limited supply of land suitable for
conservation.87 Credits are given to a landowner who enters into a

82.
Id.
83.
FWS, Safe Harbor Agreements for Private Landowners (July 2011)
(available at http://www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-library/pdf/harborqa.pdf).
84.
Id.
85.
FWS, Conservation Banking: Incentives for Stewardship (Aug. 2012)
(available
at
http://www.fws.gov/endangeredesa-library/pdf/
conservation_banking.pdf).
86.
Id.
87.
Id.
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conservation bank agreement with the FWS to protect and manage their
land for one or more listed species.88 The protections are permanent and
must be funded by a self-sustaining endowment.89 Other landowners in
the area who are proposing a project that will affect a listed species may
purchase the conservation credits in order to comply with the ESA.90
Conservation banking benefits the species by allowing development on
several smaller tracts but creating one larger tract that is actively managed
to protect the species.91
These agreements have several advantages. They increase
ecosystem connectivity because, in exchange for allowing multiple
isolated parcels to be modified, a larger tract of land is protected as a
single unit.92 They also allow for a one-time reduction in a species or its
habitat in exchange for permanently protected habitat for the remaining
members of the species.93 Conservation banking is not a new concept,
instead, the FWS modeled it after the popular wetland mitigation banks
94
that are part of Section 404 of the Clean Water Act.
The idea that a
person may pay money to harm an endangered species is a large departure
from the original ideals of the ESA. An interesting example of combining
conservation banking with an HCP is the agreement between TransCanada
and FWS.95 This agreement allows TransCanada to comply with the ESA

88.
Id.
89.
Id.
90.
Id.
91.
FWS, ESA Basics, supra n. 8, at 1.
92.
FWS, Conservation Banking, supra n. 85.
93.
J. B. Ruhl, Alan Glen, and David Hartman, Practical Guide to Habitat
Conservation Banking Law and Policy, 20 Nat. Resources & Env. 26 (2005-2006).
94.
FWS, Guidance for the Establishment, Use, and Operation of
Conservation Banks 2 (May 2, 2003) (available at http://www.fws.gov/endangered/
esa-library/pdf/Conservation_Banking_Guidance.pdf) (“The main concept behind
wetland mitigation banking is similar to that of conservation banking; to provide
compensation for adverse impacts to wetlands and other aquatic resources in advance
of the impact. Under the guidelines established for section 10 of the Rivers and
Harbors Act and section 404 of the Clean Water Act, impacts to wetlands are
mitigated sequentially by avoiding impacts, minimizing impacts, and then, as a last
resort, compensating for those impacts.”).
95.
Enercon Services, Draft Habitat Conservation Plan TransCanada
Keystone Pipeline, LP: Gulf Coast Project (Aug. 15, 2012) (available at http://
www.fws.gov/southwest/es/Oklahoma/Documents/ABB/
Final%20Draft%20Keystone%20HCP%2020120815.pdf).
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while it constructed and operates the southern portion of the Keystone XL
pipeline between Cushing, Oklahoma and Nederland, Texas, which will
result in the “take” American burying beetles (an endangered species).96
In addition to mitigation and avoidance measures, the HCP calls for
TransCanada to purchase a 1,600-acre tract of land to act as substitute
habitat for the American burying beetle habitat that was lost during
97
constriction phase.
TransCanada paid a third-party conservation group
three-million-dollars to operate the conservation bank for perpetuity.98 If
the impacts of the project on the beetle are not as large as expected,
TransCanada will be able to sell the excess American burying beetle
impact credits to other developers.99
The conservation-banking concept is new, and it has not been
toughly tested in the courts. However, if we are willing to accept the idea
that it is okay to put a price tag on our most vulnerable species, the free
market may provide a path to recovery that the original blanket prohibition
on take in the ESA was unable to provide.
V. THE ABILITY FOR SPECIES TO FALL THROUGH THE CRACKS
The FWS has been successful in fulfilling Congress’ mandate to
provide flexibility in the application of the ESA. Using its strong
bargaining position, the FWS is able to construct agreements with
landowners while remaining consistent with the “no jeopardy” provision
of the ESA.100 This flexibility, however, might be the crack in the
roadblock that allows for more extinctions. With minor modifications,
these programs could be reinforced to ensure that a species does not fall
through the regulatory cracks.

96.
Id. at 3.
97.
TransCanada, Keystone McAlester Conservation Area American
Burying Beetle Permittee Responsible Conservation Plan 3 (Nov. 16, 2012) (available
at
http://www.fws.gov/southwest/es/OklahomaDocuments/TE_Species/Keystone
/HCP%20Appendix%20B%20KMCA%20Conservation%20Plan.pdf).
98.
FWS, Agreement between the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the U.S.
Department of State, and TransCanada Keystone Pipeline 3 (no date) (available at
http://keystonepipeline-xl.state.gov/documents/organization/181193.pdf).
99.
TransCanada, supra n. 97, at 8.
100.
Uchitel, supra n. 45, at 262.
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A. The need to codify the precautionary principle in the ESA
In order to entice landowners to voluntarily take preemptive
actions to protect vulnerable species, there must be a benefit to the
landowners to take action. Currently, the FWS offers several incentives
for landowner cooperation, including issuance of ITPs and providing
assurances that no additional commitments of resources will be required if
they comply with the terms of the permit.101 This compromise from the
ideal of preventing all “take” of a listed species is reasonable and
necessary if we, as a society, want landowners to be proactive about
protecting species and habitat conservation. However, there is the
possibility for not only intentional exploitation of these exceptions, but
also for unintended consequences. , Congress acknowledged that science
often lags behind development when it enacted the ESA and made the
decision to place the survival of endangered species as the “highest of
priorities.”
The precautionary principle’s requirement to take small steps until
there is scientific certainty should be explicitly incorporated into the ITP
approval process. With endangered species, a small mistake in allowing
the take of a species or the modification of its habitat can have long lasting
consequences. The maxim “first, do no harm” should be our nation’s
guiding principle when allowing landowners to “take” an endangered
species or species in rapid decline.
B. Set a floor for scientific knowledge about a species before granting
assurances
The requirement to show that a project will not jeopardize the
survival of a species — especially when there is limited scientific
knowledge about the species — is a low threshold to meet. However, that
is all that is currently required to get a permit to take a vulnerable species
for decades. This threshold is even lower with unlisted species that are in
rapid decline because there is even less known about them.
There should be a requirement to obtain a minimum level of
scientific knowledge about the species that will be affected by a project,
including their habitat, place in the food chain, population trend, and
resilience to change, before the FWS makes any long-term commitments.

101.

See the programs discussed in Section IV.
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The FWS requires some level of knowledge about a species before taking
action, but the level of inquiry is determined on a case-by-case basis. If
there was a set minimum level of knowledge about a species as a precondition to applying for a permit, applicants would know what was
expected of them and the FWS could make better decisions. It would also
create an incentive for collaboration between landowners,
conservationists, and local governments to build up a greater knowledge
of species in the area. Increasing the knowledge about a species provides
benefits not only to the species, but also to the ecosystem as a whole.
C. Punish preemptive habitat destruction
Landowners find it too easy to avoid the ESA by destroying
habitat on their land solely to prevent a vulnerable species from occupying
it. This evasive action is exactly what the law was intended to avoid. The
ESA could be amended to punish landowners who destroy habitat solely
to drive away a listed species. This is not to say that the federal
government should be involved in every land-use planning decision.
Landowners should be free to use their land however they choose, but
when a person’s only motivation for destroying the very habitat that a
species needs to survive is to avoid regulation under the ESA, they are
also avoiding their shared responsibility as a citizen of the nation.
Preventing the extinction of endangered species is everyone’s
responsibility, and a landowner should not be allowed to place additional
burdens on his neighbors by eliminating the habitat on his land.
Although proving a landowner intentionally destroyed habitat to
avoid the ESA may be difficult, there would be cases when the
circumstantial evidence was so strong that it would be possible. And the
simple fact that destroying habitat to displace a vulnerable species is
illegal would prevent parties like the National Association of
Homebuilders from proposing this as a viable alternative.
D. Categorical exclusions for proven beneficial activities
As a roadblock statute, Congress designed the ESA to impose an
absolute prohibition on the unpermitted “take” of a listed species.
However, sometimes this prevents conservation minded parties from
taking actions to improve habitat for those species. One way to encourage
landowners to take actions that will benefit a species, but might result in a
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limited amount of harm, would be to create a categorical exclusion for
these types of actions.
A way to implement this process with limited administrative
overhead would be to allow a landowner to file a “notice of beneficial
action with the possibility of incidental take” with the FWS. In the notice,
the landowner would explain his plan and why the benefits to the species
far outweigh the amount of harm. Once filed with the FWS, the
landowner could proceed with the action without waiting for approval.
The FWS would have the documentation that it needs to follow up to
ensure that the impacts were as limited, and the benefits as large, as
claimed in the notice. If the landowner misrepresented the extent of the
take, the FWS could invalidate the permit and prosecute the landowner
under Section 9. If the landowner complied with the terms of the notice of
beneficial take, and the contents of notice of the complied with the
regulations, they would be protected.
A categorical exclusion would lower the costs to landowners who
want to improve habitat for endangered species. This idea may be
controversial, but we have to make tough choices to advance habitat
conservation. Although it could be subject to fraud, the FWS would know
where to look for abuses and who was responsible.
VI. CONCLUSION
The FWS is doing a good job of using its freedom to craft creative
solutions to advance the policies of the ESA. While these programs are
new, they tend to be the least controversial parts of the law. This
willingness to experiment should be encouraged, but the FWS should
remember that preventing the decline of vulnerable species and preserving
habitat should be the goal of any project that it approves. To that end,
modest advancements could ensure there are effective sideboards on the
FWS authority.
Every species and ecosystem is different, and the FWS must retain
the flexibility to design programs that address the circumstances on the
ground. When presented with a minimum level scientific knowledge
about a species the FWS will be able to negotiate agreements that are
more accurate. With enhanced authority to punish preemptive habitat
destruction, there will be more habitat and the costs of recovery will be
more equitably shared. Finally, enacting a categorical exclusion that
allows a landowner to file a notice of intent to improve habitat for an
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endangered species would be a small step towards making it easier for
landowners to do the right thing while lowering the costs of compliance.

